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The present study used a longitudinal design to test aspects of Kirby and Herrnstein’s  (1995) 
theory of time discounting. Specifically, the prediction that preferences reverse due to 
changes in delay was tested in a longitudinal study of career-path selections made by 
employees in a Hong Kong real estate consultancy.  Over a three-year period, 16 of 23 
subjects reversed their career preference from a future senior managerial position to a lesser 
management role available earlier.  Organizational and cultural factors which may have 
influenced these preference changes are discussed and areas of future research suggested.  
The study provides supporting evidence from the career selection perspective that 
preferences are not necessarily invariant across time. 
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Time Discounting in Relation to Career Preferences 
 
When deciding on a suitable career path, employees are often faced with the problem 
of dealing with delayed rewards, some of which involve making tradeoffs between outcomes 
occurring at different times.  The decision to outlay time in training, study, and work 
experience in order to fill a senior position at a later date can mean foregoing earlier 
promotion to less senior positions. Moreover, the choice between short-term and long-term 
values can create on an ongoing conflict, frequently leading to a change in preference at a 
later date.  The present study examined the application of time discounting theory to help 
account for career choices made by employees in a firm where there was a clear choice 
between long-term and short-term goals. 
Time discounting (also called delay discounting) refers to the devaluing of positive or 
negative outcomes as a result of delay (Hesketh 1997).  Early versions of time discounting 
theory proposed that where two goods are separated by a fixed time, they are discounted by a 
constant fraction per unit of time (e.g., Koopmans, 1960; Fishburn & Rubinstein, 1982). The 
ratio of the values of both rewards is constant across delays, so the relative preference 
between those goods is unaffected by how far in the future they may be. In essence, the 
preference is always for the shorter term reward.  
Kirby and Herrnstein (1995), however, argued that delay discount rates do not remain 
constant. Instead, they proposed that the choice between two outcomes with differing delays 
reverses as a function of the distance between the time the choice has to be made and the 
extent of the delay.  When today both the smaller, earlier reward and the larger later reward 
are far off in the future, the latter is preferred over the former. In other words, at this point 
people express a preference for the longer term goal. However, as time passes and the two 
alternatives become nearer to the present, the preference reverses to the more immediate goal, 
crossing over at point C in Kirby and Herrnstein’s (1995) illustration of what has been 
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Key:  SER = smaller, earlier reward 
  LLR = larger, later reward 
Figure 1 
 
Reversal Model of Time Discounting (from Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995) 
 
 
The hyperbolic discounting model, accounting as it does for reversals of preference 
over time, has received strong support from a variety of disciplines. The relationship between 
time discounting and aspects of decision-making at work was examined by Hesketh, Watson-
Brown and Whiteley (1998).  They argued that career decision making often involves a 
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choice between nearer goals of lesser value and more distant goals of greater value, a 
scenario that fits the time discounting paradigm. In a series of studies Hesketh et al. (1998) 
demonstrated that value discounting follows the hyperbolic discount function when applied 
to job selection, that discounting patterns varied with the age of participants, and that 
discounting tends to be reduced when the period of delay is filled with meaningful activity. 
This promising research was conducted with university students under laboratory conditions, 
a context in which it may have been difficult for the participants to give the choices the 
degree of importance they would normally assume when making real-life career decisions.  
Further, it was obviously not possible to reproduce the actual time frame over which the 
participants' preferences might be expected to change.  However, the study drew attention to 
the relevance of time discounting to this field and its role in bringing about preference 
reversals in career decision-making. 
To add to the research on time discounting relating to employee career-path decisions 
and to improve the ecological validity of research conducted in this field, the present study 
investigated job preferences of selected high talented staff members during a five-year 
development course designed to prepare them for senior management. The organization 
involved recognised that effective performance at the senior level required a breadth of 
training and experience that would take some years for trainees to accumulate, requiring them 
in the meantime to bypass lesser advancement opportunities. These conditions are very 
similar to those listed by Hesketh et al. (1998) as justifying the application of time 
discounting theory to job selection. In particular, the requirement for individuals to invest 
substantial time and energy in extensive study or training when the benefits follow much 
later. This is precisely the condition imposed on the employees of the company involved 
here. In addition to the delayed gratification, employees of the present company were likely 
to be tempted by lesser shorter term rewards, another classic characteristic of time 
discounting situations. Given these conditions it was expected that, over time, employees' 
preferences would show the classic reversal pattern described by Kirby and Herrnstein (1995) 





The research was conducted within the Hong Kong Branch of a leading real estate 
consultancy. The participants were 23 Hong Kong Chinese employees selected for a senior 
management development program. Of these, 19 were males and 4 were females, their ages 
ranging between 23 and 32 years at the time of selection.  
 
Materials 
The trainees’ ongoing commitment to the development program was gauged through 
repeated administrations of a single item bipolar scale termed the Career Preference Scale 
(CPS). The CPS was developed for the present study but was similar in format to scales used 
by other researchers in this field (e.g., Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991; Hesketh et al., 1998). 
The CPS required respondents to indicate their preference for promotion to a senior 
management position in x years time or promotion to a middle management position in y 
years time. For scoring purposes, strong preference for a later senior management 
appointment was rated as +10, undecided was rated as 0, and strong preference for an early 
middle management appointment  was scored as -10. Responses could range anywhere 
between the –10 and +10 extremes. To avoid possible bias, mathematical symbols did not 
appear on the actual form.  
The CPS was administered by the one of the investigators at the commencement of 
the development program and then again at 13 months, 25 months, and 35 months into the 
program, making four times in all. Plans to administer it a fifth time were abandoned when 
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the company introduced significant changes to the program after the 35 month point. For 
each administration of the CPS, the periods of delay for senior (x) and middle management 
(y) appointments were reduced as follows: 1) senior management appointment in five years 
or middle management appointment in three years; 2) senior management appointment in 
four years or middle management appointment in two years; 3) senior management 
appointment in three years or middle management appointment in one year; 4) senior 
management appointment in two years or middle management appointment as soon as a 
position became available. The CPS is reproduced in Appendix A. 
In addition to the CPS, participants were also asked to answer two further questions: 
Q1) "I am prepared to continue getting the training and experience necessary to reach a 
senior management position"; and Q2) "I would accept a middle management position if it 
were offered soon".  A five point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) was used for both these questions, which were administered at the same time 
as the CPS. Assessing preferences for the two career options in this unipolar format allowed 
us to check the attractiveness of the two options across the period of the study. All those 
participating in this study had an excellent command of English, the language used for both 
the CPS and the supplementary questions. 
 
Procedure 
The 23 trainees selected for the development program attended a two-day orientation 
course that outlined the form and content of future training.  During the orientation course 
frequent emphasis was placed on the lengthy duration of the forthcoming program required in 
order to gain the expertise and breadth of experience necessary for effective senior 
management.  The trainees accepted the extended time span and were very positive toward 
the program in general. Because of the commitment required by participants, regular 
supervision and periodic monitoring of their attitudes and career preferences were regarded 
as critical supporting initiatives if the program was to succeed. The four administrations of 
the CPS were treated as part of the monitoring process. At these periodical administrations, 
which were always conducted by one of the investigators, the trainees were assured of 
confidentiality and were asked to be frank and honest in their responses. The data collection 
was explained as part of an overall evaluation of the senior executive program.  
Results 
The CPS required participants to indicate the strength of their interest in their current 
career path preference. At the first administration, made at the program’s commencement, the 
CPS showed lead times of five years (senior management) and three years (middle 
management).  Subsequent administrations progressively shortened the intervals to both 
rewards. The effect of the ever-reducing period of delay may be seen in Table 1.  Here, the 
raw scores for each of the participants for each administration of the CPS have been tabulated 
and a mean determined.  These means were derived from scores of the participants still in the 
program at the time of administration. In this sense, they are a conservative estimate of the 
appeal of shorter term rewards because they do not include data from employees who 
resigned or transferred out of the program. 
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Table 1 
Individual Career Preference Scale Scores and Means For Each Administration (N = 23)  
Participant Administrations of CPS 
 1st (Start) 2nd  (13 months) 3rd  (25 months) 4th (35 months) 
A 8 6 0 -4 
B 9 7 0 TFR 
C 9 7 5 5 
D 8 6 0 -6 
E 7 1 0 TFR 
F 8 -2 RSG RSG 
G 6 6 4 -6 
H 6 5 0 -6 
I 8 2 -4 TFR 
J 8 8 6 6 
K 8 6 2 -6 
L 6 RSG RSG RSG 
M 7 7 7 3 
N 10 8 8 8 
O 10 4 -4 -6 
P 6 0 RSG RSG 
Q 5 1 TFR RSG 
R 6 6 4 TFR 
S 8 8 6 6 
T 8 6 0 6 
U 6 -6 RSG RSG 
V 6 RSG RSG RSG 
W 8 8 6 8 
     
Means + 7.44 + 4.48 + 2.35 + 0.62 
 
 Key:  RSG = Resigned 




It can be seen from column 1 that all participants favoured the longer term goal at the 
outset. This is not surprising, given that they knew the aims of the program and had agreed to 
be included. By the end of the third year of the program (4th administration of CPS), 
however, 10 participants had dropped out because of transfers or resignations. All 10 of these 
were initially in favour of waiting for a senior executive position at the completion of the 
five-year program, as shown by their scores in column 1. Their transfers and resignations are 
taken as indicating a behavioral switch to an earlier reward, an interpretation that is supported 
by their decreasing scores prior to dropping out. Decreasing scores were also evident among 
those who stayed in the program: compared with shorter term rewards the attractiveness of 
long term senior executive appointments diminished with the passage of time. In total, 16 
employees either left the program or ended up with negative scores on the CPS by the 35th 
month. The trend of the means suggests that more reversals were likely before the program 
was completed, although the increasing proximity of the final goal over the last two years of 
the program may have led to an upward kick in the preferences for this goal. A final point to 
note from Table 1 is that there were marked individual differences in these time discounting 
data. Some participants reversed preferences very early, others maintained a strong 
preference for long term rewards even after three years.  
The bipolar format of the CPS forced participants to choose either goal, or to indicate 
neutrality. The two supplementary questions, however, allowed participants to rate the 
attractiveness of the two options separately. Figure 2 plots the mean responses to each 
question. To calculate the mean response to Q1 ("I am prepared to continue getting the 
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training and experience necessary to reach a senior management position"), all missing data 
points were assigned the value 2 (Disagree). Similarly, for Q2 (" I would accept a promotion 
to middle management if it was offered now"), missing data points were replaced with the 
value 4 (Agree). Arguably, the missing data points could be given the value 1 for Q1 and 5 
for Q2 on the grounds that those missing had shown quite emphatically that by leaving the 
program they valued a shorter term goal more highly. The more conservative values were 
used, however, because although employees who had left or resigned were contacted, we still 
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SER = Mean response (N = 23) to question "I would accept a promotion to middle 
management if it was offered now". 
 
LLR = Mean response (N = 23) to question " I am prepared to continue getting the training 




Mean Responses to Questions Regarding Value of Early Middle Management Promotion  
(SER) and Later Senior Management Promotion (LLR) 
 
From Figure 3 it can be seen that after the initial enthusiasm, the perceived value of 
the longer term reward decreased in the middle stages of the program. Such an outcome is not 
predicted by the time discounting model proposed by Kirby and Herrnstein (1995) where the 
attractiveness of both options is expected to continue to increase (see Figure 1). It can also be 
seen that there was a marked increase in the perceived value of shorter term rewards after a 
year or so of the program. The cross-over point predicted by Kirby and Herrnstein had been 
reached by the 35 month stage of this 60 month program. The dotted lines for both reward 
outcomes beyond the 35th month indicate that we have no further data and that we are 
speculating beyond this stage. As mentioned earlier, the program was revised substantially 
after this point, rendering any subsequent data collection meaningless. Our main expectation 
would be that the remaining trainees would show a characteristic upward  lift in their 
preference for the longer term goal as the program entered its final stages. In the situation 
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described in this study, preference for the shorter term goal may even decline over the 
concluding stages as the major reward draws closer. To reflect our uncertainty about the 
perceived value of the SER beyond the 35 month point, we have drawn dotted lines going up 
(as predicted for the classic time-discounting situation) and also going down (as seems more 




The partial results reported here demonstrate that changes do occur in career 
preferences over time as a function of proximity of rewards of differing absolute value.  The 
resignations and transfers, combined with the shift in preference in the questionnaire data 
from long term rewards towards short term rewards, is consistent with the reversal view of 
time-discounting put forward by Kirby and Herrnstein in their challenge to traditional 
economic theory and supported by Hesketh et al. (1998) in their laboratory study of job 
selection. The present study also shows that this phenomenon occurs when the shorter term 
reward is not at some fixed interval from the longer term reward – a situation typifying most 
time discounting studies - but is available at more or less random points according to labour 
market demands. A further interesting point to note in these data is that people do not appear 
to switch preferences on the spur of the moment. Seven out of the ten employees who 
resigned or transferred out of the senior development program gave indications 12 months 
ahead that they were losing interest in the long term path (Table 1). 
Unfortunately, there was no opportunity to observe what might have happened 
beyond the 35 month period. Taking note of the high attrition rate to that point, the company 
modified the course, incorporating a number of initiatives to make it more attractive.  These 
included: a) appointment of participants to middle-management status within the program 
after three years of satisfactory progress; b) raising the commencement age of new 
participants so that they can acquire more experience before joining the program; c) regular 
counselling of all trainees by a personnel manager; d) measurement of progress through 
setting and meeting a series of short term goals; e) a review of the remuneration package of 
those participating. 
The fact that changes of this magnitude had to be introduced argues for the strength of 
the time discounting effect in job selection decisions. Despite high levels of initial 
commitment to long term goals, this commitment will weaken unless compensatory 
mechanisms are put in place. Appointing the trainees to middle management status at the 
midpoint of the program and increasing their remuneration package substantially reduces the 
gap between the perceived values of the shorter and longer term rewards. Likewise, the 
introduction of goal setting and regular counselling sessions should act as "filler activities", 
which Hesketh et al. (1998) found to decrease the time discounting effect. These initiatives 
should all work against the time discounting effect.  
 
Limitations of Study 
 There are important differences in the design of this study to those employed in 
laboratory studies of time discounting (e.g., Hesketh et al., 1998). The necessity to abandon 
the project at the 35 month point is an obvious methodological shortcoming of the study in 
that we were not able to observe what happened over the final stages of the program. As with 
most field studies, the gains in ecological validity were offset to some extent by the loss of 
control. Whereas in laboratory studies it is possible to fix the point where short term and long 
term rewards are to be attained, in the present study we were able to fix only the long term 
reward. Although participants were admitted to the senior executive program on the 
understanding that they would see it through, in reality they had the opportunity to accept 
short term rewards from both outside and within the company at any time. The random 
timing of the short term rewards and the unknown values of these rewards (resignations and 
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transfers) prevented a proper test of the mathematical model proposed by Kirby and 
Herrnstein (1995). Instead, we were restricted to searching for evidence that people behave in 
a way that is either consistent or inconsistent with the model. 
The small sample size was a further limitation, making it difficult to search for 
individual differences variables that covary with the time discounting phenomenon. Gender 
was the only variable that stood out as a possible moderating variable with three out of the 
four females electing longer term rewards right up to the 35 month period, but even here the 
numbers were too small to warrant firm conclusions.  
When considering threats to the external validity of the study, it is important to draw 
attention to some contextual factors that were perhaps unique to Hong Kong and the period. 
The frenetic pace of building construction and property dealing over the period of the study 
provided many openings at the middle-management level. Thus, there was an 
uncharacteristically high level of recruitment to middle-management level during this period. 
A second important contextual factor was the transition of sovereignty from Britain to China. 
From July 1997, the people of Hong Kong became not only Chinese by culture, but also by 
nationality. The general commercial uncertainty created by the impending transition may 
have resulted in additional pressures to accept immediate rewards. Whilst these conditions 
were ideal for testing the resolve of employees undertaking a program aimed at highly valued 
but longer term goals, they were probably not typical of a normal commercial environment. 
 
Future Studies 
Not all individuals in the present study made the reversal in preference. Hesketh et al 
(1998) found a link between anxiety and time discounting with anxious people more likely to 
choose a shorter term reward, and we have noted a possible association with gender, but there 
is still much to be done in this area. If variables such as anxiety covary with time discounting 
behaviour in a laboratory setting, their effect should be much stronger in a field setting where 
the timing and value of the shorter term reward is unknown and where the pressure to 
increase income to meet current financial obligations is high. Identification of individual 
differences variables that enable people to resist these pressures will help us to understand 
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APPENDIX  1 
 
CAREER PREFERENCE SCALE 
 
 
Notes to Participants: 
• Here you have the opportunity to indicate the type of management career you are 
currently seeking. 
• Bearing in mind the time delays involved, if you had to select between a promotion to a 
senior management position in x years time* and a middle management position in y 
years time*, which of these career paths would you choose today? 
• Place one tick on the line below to indicate the present degree of interest you have in that 
future career path. For example, a rating of 2 means that right now you are a little 
interested in that position when it comes up and a rating of 10 means that right now you 
are extremely interested. 
 
 
Senior Management       Undecided  Middle Management 
(Later Appointment)             (Earlier Appointment) 
   
      ____________________________________________________   Place tick on line 
 




*The number of years shown decreased with each succeeding administration.  For a senior 
management position, the period remaining in years was shown successively as 5, 4, 3, 2.  
For a middle management position the first three administrations showed the interval 
remaining in years as 3,  2,  and 1 respectively, with the final administration reading “as soon 
as possible”. 
